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Abstract
In this paper we analyze a special subset of the Hungarian aHa´lo´ network database, one that contains
different economic, political and personal relations in a form of a single network. We narrowed down
the original dataset to speciﬁc types of economic, political and personal relations. The sampled network
has small-world, scale-free and non-transitive properties. Our hypothesis was that many actors (i.e.
nodes in the network) share different types of economic and political relationships. This hypothesis is
not conﬁrmed in the study, as we only found a low number of node-pairs that share a given type of
economic link and some type of political link at a time.
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1 Introduction
It is of high importance to study the relationship between economic and political spheres. These relations
can reveal possible corruption, can serve as attributes of society’s institutions, can reﬂect political-
business cycles, or reveal the average atmosphere and level of trust in a country. In this paper we analyze
such relations on a Hungarian database that contains several connections between the actors of economic
and political life. Since the numeric value of the country’s Corruption Perception Index is known to be
quite high (it has a value of 53 on a 100 point scale - according to Transparency International [1]) we
expect valuable observations to emerge where the political and economic relations are thus merged. The
current work also merits attention because it is one of the ﬁrst analyses of this major Hungarian social
and political network database called aHa´lo´.
Here we ﬁrst sketch the basic aspects of the analysis of political-economic relations in general, then
introduce and analyze the particular network under study, and test our a priori expectation that personal,
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political and economic dimensions are strongly connected in the available data.
2 Relations between the economic and political spheres
In this section we introduce the studies that emphasize the importance of politicians’ business connec-
tions (and the other way around). In this short paper we do not have the possibility to explore and
analyze truly complex relationships, yet it may important to illustrate the basics.
One of the ﬁrst questions that can be raised is how companies and actors that possess direct political
connections perform in the market. Are they more successful economically? Amy J. Hillman [8] tried
to answer this in her article ”Politicians on the board of directors”. The author analyzed companies in
both heavily regulated markets and less regulated markets, and searched for how common is that (ex-
)politicians are at the same (or a different) time high level executives of the companies. She found that
politicians are more typical economic actors in those markets that are more heavily regulated, moreover,
that companies led by politicians are preforming better in these markets.
Bertrand et al. [2] have studied similarly the performance of well-connected companies in the light
of political-business cycles. In their research, they analyzed what happened with stock-exchange com-
panies that feature ex-politician executives in the years of national elections. Their results show that in
the crucial years of elections, these companies were more active in employing new people and extending
capacities than their not-so-well-connected counterparts, even though state support or trade aid was not
effecting these processes directly. It is worth highlighting that at the same time, because of their raising
costs (salaries and costs of capacity extensions), these companies realized lower proﬁt levels.
Schleifer and Vishny [10] modeled the relationships of companies and politicians. In their article
”Politicians and ﬁrms” they outlined a model, where, if politicians are leading companies (such as
public ﬁrms or freshly privatized former state ﬁrms) the managers follow a set of practices that are inde-
pendent from the political goals, whereas, if genuine managers are leading the company, the politicians
try to bribe them with concessions, aid or money to make them act more politically. According to their
model, such rent-type concessions and aids are more harmful in the case of politician-led companies;
therefore, they conclude that successful privatization can lead to a more efﬁcient market equilibrium
[10]. This model inﬂuenced other researchers as well: Claessens and Djankov [6] studied the same
effects in the Central-East European environment after the collapse of Communism and in the result-
ing transformation. They ﬁnd that an effective privatization process can indeed lead to more proﬁtable
companies and more effective market equilibrium - also in the case of not politically led companies.
Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang [5] studied other aspects of business-politics relations in
their article emph”Big business owners in politics”. Using a Thailand database, they state that the
wealthier the leader of a company, the more plausible is that she/he will run for high political posi-
tions. As politicians, then, these people are more likely to support policies in the interests of their own
company, although they are typically not supporting their own companies with public resources directly.
Let us summarize the results. These studies show various effects of political inﬂuences in the market
environment. In the short term, political inﬂuence can boost the performance of companies in those
sectors, where keeping good relationship with the state is important. On the contrary, if a company
operation serves direct political goals, this may cause a worse performance with fewer proﬁts. Such
a political goal can include labor and capacity expansion according to political-business cycles that
may lead to less effective operations and less proﬁts. Moreover, it is worth mentioning that not only
politicians may have business interests, but also business leaders may try to run for political positions.
These political positions help them inﬂuence state regulation and the economic environment, but do not
lead to a direct ﬁnancial support of the companies from public sources.
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3 The database
3.1 Background: the K-Monitor organization
For the following analyses we use the aHa´lo´ database of the K-Monitor civil organization from Hun-
gary. The K-Monitor Independent Public Financial Monitoring Service is a civil organization that ﬁghts
against the spread of corruption in the country by collecting data from public procurement procedures.
This civil organization collects data about public spending and corruption from the public media, and
organizes them into a library. At the website of K-Monitor1, we can ﬁnd neutral, aggregated informa-
tion about actors and activities, helping the creation of public discourses about them. The organization
continuously develops the database using automatized search and parsing as well as manual work.
3.2 The aHa´lo´ project
K-Monitor operates the aHa´lo´ project, producing a database developed under the supervision of the
second and third authors. The goal of the project is to automatically collect and aggregate public data
about the network of Hungarian politicians and business actors. The data is made available in the form
of a visualized network at the project website2 that helps achieve understanding and transparency.
The aHa´lo´ database currently contains information from:
• Procurement reports,
• The database of National Development Agency (state support),
• The data of Bureau for agriculture and rural development (state support)
• List of state executives (since 1990)
• List of municipal ofﬁcials
• List of companies owned be politicians and party members
• List companies that had public mandate
• Newspaper articles about business relations and about the use of public sources.
This major database has hardly been analyzed yet. The purpose of the present paper is to describe
the characteristics of the database with repsect to the different type of relations, highlighting those that
represent both political and economic ties between actors.
4 Analyses of networks built from the database
4.1 The entire network of aHa´lo´
The whole database can be handled as a single big network, where there are currently 169,459 nodes
(i.e. persons and organizations) and 1,748,040 directed links [7]. There are three major categories of
links: links between persons (P2P), links between organizations (O2O) and links between persons and
organizations (P2O). The different types of relations can be attributed with different edges that arise
from the various data sources. There are altogether 140 types of detailed connections in the database.
1http://www.k-monitor.hu
2http://www.ahalo.hu
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1 P2P-advisor 11 P2O-owner
2 P2P-friend 12 P2O- Company partner (full)
3 P2P-fellow representatives 13 P2O-Company partner (silent)
4 P2P-common organizational background 14 P2O-Founder/shareholder
5 P2P-relative 15 P2O- Founder/shareholder (1 person)
6 P2P-fellow municipality representative 16 P2O-Member of general partnership
7 P2P-candidate of the same party 17 P2O-ineterest/subsidiary (Ltd)
8 P2P-fellow candidate 18 P2O-Private company owner
9 P2P-fellow representatives in the Parliament 19 P2O-member of an association
10 P2P-fellow representatives in the EP
Table 1: Types of edges in the reduced network (Source: selection from the aHa´lo´ database)
4.2 The narrower network of personal relations
As we are interested in the economic relations of politicians, we analyze P2P and P2O links only.
According to this criterion, we have narrowed down the database to just 19 types of edges (Table 1).
The reduced network has 35,393 nodes and 387,210 edges.
4.3 Properties of the reduced network
We ﬁrst examine those main properties of the network that generally serve as useful information: is it a
small-world network, is it scale-free, is it clustered? [9].
Figure 1: Degree distribution of the reduced network. Left: in-degree, rigtht: out-degree
Small-world property. Small world networks are those where the typical distance between two ran-
domly chosen nodes grows proportionally to the logarithm of the number of nodes in the network [9].
In the case of our network, this value is 4,248, and the network is clearly a small-world network.
Scale-free property. A scale-free network is one where the degree distribution follows a power law
[9]. This practically means that besides many low degree edges, there are a few very high-degree edges
(that are connected to many other edges, in turn). In our case, the network approximates a scale-free
distribution: while the average degree is 10.49, there are a few edges connected to more than 20,000
other edges (both in- and out–degrees). Figure 1 shows a log-log plot for visual inspection.
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Clustering coefﬁcient (i.e. transitivity property). The clustering coefﬁcient C of a network shows
how well the neighboring edges connect to each other (”my-friends-are-friends” property). More pre-
cisely, C is the ratio of links connecting a node’s neighbors divided by the maximum possible number
of such links. The property thus measured can also be called transitivity for the obvious reason [9]. In
our network, C is very low (0.1), so we can conclude that the network is non-transitive.
4.4 The intersection of different types of edges
As seen in Table 1, different types of P2P and P2O correspond to different types of edges. We could
thus construct several sub-networks for all different types of edges, which would show a more nuanced
view of each speciﬁc type of relationship. The different types of edges can be sorted into three groups:
• Political relationship (3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10)
• Economic relationship (11-19)
• Personal relationship (1, 2, 5)
One of the main goals of this paper is to analyze how political relationships share the links of
economic relationships. Thus we look for cases where persons (i.e. nodes) can be connected with more
than one types of relationships. In order to ﬁnd these cases, we collect the number of nodes that can be
afﬁliated with different types of relationships at the same time.
This serves as a test of our hypothesis that such relations are strongly manifest in the dataset and
that personal political and economic ties are closely related in many cases.
Below (Table 2) we show a matrix of tables, where different vectors made from a series of common
nodes are shown in the context of different political and economic relationships. We highlight the
numbers of interest. In these tables, we can see that relative to the aforementioned high number of
edges and links, there are just a very few nodes with more than one different types of connections with
another node. And the most common of them is the one when candidates of the same party are also
company partners (135 full partners, 156 silent partners), and this is the most frequent type of political
link in the network.
As we possess data for the purely personal relations as well, we also have the possibility to study the
intersection of personal and economic relations. In Table 3 we can see that there are just a few nodes
that share the same economic and personal relations. Again, company members can be found among
friends and relatives, but these are extremely low numbers, if we think about the size of the network or
the number of the different types of links.
So in conclusion we cannot support the fundamental hypothesis that - at the level of available data -
personal political and economic ties would strongly intertwined. Seeking for the reasons leads us to our
discussion section.
5 Discussion
In this short paper we have analyzed a special subset of the aHa´lo´ network database. We narrowed
down the original dataset to different types of economic, political and personal relations. The resulting
network is a small-world, essentially scale-free and non-transitive network. (Other approaches to key
network properties have not been considered in this paper, such as those based on link prediction [3] or
”signiﬁcance” [4]. Similar studies are left to future work.)
Our initial hypothesis was that many actors (i.e. nodes in the network) share different types of
economic and political relationships. This hypothesis does not seem to hold, however, since we only
found a relatively low number node-pairs that share some type of economic link and some type of
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Fellow representatives Fellow representatives at
municipality level
Owner 1 15
Company partner (full) 0 70





Member of a gen. partner-
ship
0 1
Interest/subsidiary (Ltd) 0 0
Private company owner 0 0
Member of an association 0 0
Fellow party candidates Fellow candidate
Owner 32 0
Company partner (full) 135 0





Member of a general part-
nership
7 0
Interest/subsidiary (Ltd) 0 0
Private company owner 2 0






Company partner (full) 36 1





Member of a general part-
nership
1 0
Interest/subsidiary (Ltd) 0 0
Private company owner 0 0
Member of an association 0 0
Table 2: Matrices of different political and economic relationships
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Advisor Friend Relative
Owner 4 10 24
Company partner (full) 6 16 27
Company partner (silent) 4 12 22
Funder/shareholder 0 2 4
Funder/shareholder (1 person) 1 3 6
Member of a general partnership 0 1 1
Interest/subsidiary (Ltd) 0 0 0
Private company owner 1 0 0
Member of an association 0 0 0
Table 3: Matrix of personal and economic relationships
political link simultaneously. Yet we nevertheless also see that some interlinks between politics and
economy exist - to be examined in future work.
On the other hand, we have to carefully consider the interpretation of the ﬁndings because of the
limitations of the research. One of the biggest challenges is the quality of data. Analyzing connections
between people is a new ﬁeld of science and as such researches lack experience of data collection. As
connections can vary on a wide scale, it is hard to deﬁne what kind of data should be collected. For
the current research the biggest obstacle is that connections are unweighted, and as a consequence,
the intensity of business connections are not measurable (such as the volume and value of business
transactions).
Analytically speaking, we can identify the following limitations or rather speciﬁcs of the data col-
lection process:
1. Too little data, resulting in homogenous business connections. Business partnerships between
small SMEs are just treated the same way as billion dollar transactions between large business
partners. As the edges only able to show connections between people, the ﬁndings regarding trans-
fers, wealth or ﬁnancial well-being would thus be unreliable. Under the current circumstances the
intensity of connections solely depends on the number of business connections between partners
in the database.
2. The research involves business connections only. As such it is unable to reﬂect other connection
types that may affect business connections (think of connections such as friendships among in-
ﬂuential individuals). Such a limitation can restrict the ﬁndings in case of Hungary. As a result
of increasing volume of public investments in all economic sectors and high level of corruption
businessmen having rather political than business connections can easily gain power within the
network of economic and political elite.
3. Lack of proper data. Referring to the second section, it is important to note that (1) it is not evident
what type of data should be recorded and (2) all the data is from publicly available sources that
means the analyzed network do not involve not public connections between people. As a result
there may be connections between people that we do not know about.
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